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THE JJJ t}J ~ON 
PROTECTION NEEDS 
IN HUMANITARIAN 
DEMINING by Andy Smith, Consultant 
• 30. 
W en assessing protection needs, my ap-proach has been to determine what the isks are, what injuries result and then 
decide how to minimize these risks and protect against 
any residual danger. I also bear in mind that there is 
no point in prescribing an action or a garment that 
will nor be used. 
Though this method may be practical, it is not 
an approach endorsed by the protective equipment 
industry, which seems to prefer co base their assess-
ment of risk on experimental data and a scale of in-
jury used in the aucomobile industry. If the injuries 
they commonly predicted were accurate, all of the 
deminer victims l know would be dead. Most of them 
are at work. 
Anyone considering this matter objectively 
should bear in mind that deminers do nor want co 
wear any equipment that is uncomfortable, heavy, re-
strictive of movement or thought to be unnecessary. 
Demining program managers do nor wam co buy 
equipment that will not be used or is expensive to 
purchase and replace. They also are aware that 
demining incidents are extremely rare. I believe that 
severe incidents occur at the rare of one per 25-30 
years of actual demining experience for each deminer. 
This statement ignores the fact that some groups have 
more incidents or work in more dangerous areas than 
others, but it does explain why most deminers have 
never seen an incident. 
The following paper draws on information de-
rived from five years of field research and from an 
inti mare knowledge of the incident data in rhe Data-
base of Demining Incident Victims (DDIV). The 
DDIV stems from my work during 1998 and 1999 
for the U .S. Army CECOM NVESD Humanitarian 
Demining research initiative. It covers all recorded 
explosive incidents that have occurred while demining 
in Angola, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Laos and Zimbabwe. It also covers all 
the usefully recorded incidents that occurred in Af-
ghanistan (1997-99) and those made available from 
Kosovo. It does not include derails of civilian incidents 
and injuries. Often with considerable derail about the 
circumstances surrounding an incident, the records 
provide a reference for an informed analysis. 
The DDIV has been accepted as an authorita-
tive resource by GICHD in irs work advising there-
vision of UN standards for HD. The DDIV is avail-
able on CD. 
Eye injury is common and easy to avoid. 
Phoro c/o Andy Smith 
Threat activities 
There are many opinions of what constitutes the 
greatest threat in demining. Using the DDIV as a 
data resource, it is possible to reduce the perceived 
threats to those that have a real manifestation. The 
"threats" are listed in terms of incident types and fre-
quency. 
Type of incident Number of 
victims 
Excavation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I .1 9 
Missed-mine ................................ 85 
Handling ..................................... 32 
Victim inattencion ....................... 25 
Detectiot1/tripwire ........... ............ 18 
Survey ....... ...................... ............. 16 
Vegetation removal ...... ... ............. 12 
Other .... ........................... ............ 10 
Demolition ...... ... .................. ... ...... 7 
Detection ........ ... ................. .. .. .. ..... 6 
One can see that "excavation" is the most frequent 
incident to occur. The second most likely type is a 
"missed-mine"; it involves a deminer stepping on a 
device missed during clearance. The essential differ-
ence is that rhe first is deliberate (the detector reading 
must be exposed by excavation) while the second is 
accidental (no one intended to miss the mine). In the 
first case, the victim is doing what must be done; in 
the second, he is the victim of someone else's mistakes. 
Injuries Sustained 
In the DDIV, injuries likely to be life-threaten-
ing to require surgery or result in permanent disabil-
ity are rated as severe. All others are rated as minor. 
For the whole database2 the following injuries 
are recorded: 
Face/head/neck 
Severe eye 60, minor 37 
Severe face 19, minor 100 
Severe head 17, minor 16 
Severe neck 5, minor 23 
TotaL 101 severe injuries 
Hand/arm 
Severe hand 34, minor 84 
Amputation of hand 8 
Amputation of finger 26 
Severe arm 25, minor 66 
Amputation of arm 13 
Total: I 06 severe injuries 
Leg/foot 
Severe leg 40, minor 94 
Severe foot 17, minor 10 
Amputation of leg 63 
Amputation of foot 9 
Amputation of roes 1 
Total: 130 severe injuries 
Body/trunk 
Severe body 13, minor 36 
Severe chest 18, minor 37 
Severe genital 11, minor 5 
Total: 42 severe injuries 
The table reveals that there are more severe lower 
limb injuries than any other. What is not immedi-
ately obvious is that the most common type of inci-
dent, "excavation," rarely involves any lower limb 
injury. This fact is explained because lower limb in-
juries tend to be disproportionately severe. 
Devices Involved 
l am defining the threat as the mine(s)/devices 
most commonly occurring in recorded incidents in 
any one theater and omitting the AT mine threat. The 
DDIV includes records of two incidents involving an 
AT mine, both were fatal. Such cases being rare and 
seemingly impossible to protect against, I have left 
them out of this analysis. 
The Blast Mine Threat 
Mghanistan- PMN (240g TNT) mine featured 
in 62 injuries. 
Angola- PPM-2 (liOg TNT) mine featured in 
12 injuries (PMN in six). 
Bosnia-Herzegovina- PMA-3 (35gTetryl) mine 
featured in seven injuries; the PMA-2 (1 OOg TNT) 
mine featured in five injuries. 
Cambodia- PMN-2 mine featured in at least 
21; the "minimum metal" mines Type 72 (a or b) (51g 
TNT) featured in 13; and the M14 and MD82B (27/ 
28g) featured in eight (total of 21 minimum metal 
mines). 
Iraq - the PMN (240g TNT) mine featured in 
five injuries. 
Laos- none recorded. 
Kosovo - the PMA-rwo mines featured in four 
111JUrleS. 
Mozambique - PMN (240g TNT) mine fea-
tured in 14 injuries. 
Zimbabwe- R2M2 (58g RDX/WAX) mine fea-
tured in 10 injuries. 
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In half of the countries, the PMN and/or PMN-
2 represent the largest AP blast threats. 
The Fragmentation Mine Threat 
Afghanistan - POMZ (75g TNT ) mine fea-
tured in I 0 fragmentation injuries. 
Angola - POMZ (75g TNT) mine featured in 
one fragmentation injury. 
Bosni a-Herz.egovina -PROM - I (425g T NT ) 
mine featured in 17 (all) fragmentation injuries. 
Cambodia - PO MZ (75g T NT) mine featured 
in one fragmentatio n injury. 
Iraq - Yalmara-69 (450g Comp B) featured in 
three injuries (PROM- I also featured in two of 
these). 
Kosovo - no fragmentation injuries are recorded 
(still waiting fo r data). 
Laos - a mortar featured in the only recorded 
Ill jury. 
Mozambique - OZM-4 (170g TNT ) mine fea-
tured in seven or eight fragmentation injuries. 
Zimbabwe - none recorded. 
T he PROM-1, OZM- 4 and POMZ represent 
the greatest threat (in that order), but the PRO M -1 
does not feature in the data for Cambodia, Afghani-
stan, Laos, Kosovo, Zimbabwe, Angola or 
Mozambique. Of those cou ntries, it is known to be 
common in Kosovo. 
The Ordnance Threat3 
Afghanistan - a fuse fea tured in nine (of 12) 
ordnance related injuries. 
Angola - no ordnance related injuries are re-
corded. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina - a grenade featured in the 
only ordnance related injury recorded. 
Cambodia - a fuse featured in four (of four) ord-
nance related injuries. 
Iraq - no ordnance related injuries are recorded. 
Kosovo - no ordnance injuries are recorded (still 
waiting for data). 
Laos - phosphorous from an inadequately de-
stroyed mortar featu red in the only recorded injury. 
Mozambique - a fuse featured in the only ord-
nance related injury. 
Zimbabwe - no ordnance related injuries are re-
corded, but AP mi ne fuses featured in two recorded 
injuries. 
Fuses are the most common cause of UXO in-
jury with grenades being the next most common. 
• 32. 
Reducing Risk 
Most practical people accept that there are two 
ways to reduce the risk of severe injury in an incident. 
The first is to avoid the incident. The second is to 
provide effective protective equipment to limit any 
injury that occu rs. 
Avoiding risk can be ach ieved by revising the 
techniques used or by enforcing the application of op-
erating proced ures known to be safe. The DDIV re-
corded 82 incidents where a primary cause was "man-
agement inadequacy"-usually the failure to provide 
appropriate equ ipment or traini ng. A further 190 
incidents have "field control inadequacy," recorded as 
their primary cause. In these cases, deminers were not 
working as directed by management, and their errors 
were nor corrected by management. O ften they were 
obeying their field supervisors! T hese listings show 
that more than 82 percent of incidents may have been 
avoidable if appropriate controls were in place. Even 
allowing for revision downwards, this point illustrates 
that atten tion paid to improved management at all 
levels could be an effective way to reduce severe in-
jury. 
W hen everything has been done to avoid an in-
cident, provis ion must be made to protect against any 
residual risk. The initial problem with this method is 
that it is impossible to protect against the worst mines. 
Bounding fragmentation mines are reported to spread 
fragments at velocities up to 1 ,200 m/s; a speed more 
than twice the size most body armors are capable of 
withstanding and four times the size the best visors 
are capable of withstanding. Deminers who trigger a 
mine at close quarters invariably die whether or not 
they were wearing protection. T he answer is to try 
harder to avoid that risk. Strategies for th is approach 
exist, such as cutting undergrowth with protected ma-
chines, avoid ing render-safe procedures using make-
shift clips (a risk revealed by the D DIV) and gener-
ally keeping the deminer away from the th reat. 
T he most common activity at the time of an in-
cident is "excavation" of a detector reading. This ac-
tivity must be carried out, and explosions have oc-
curred when no "mistake" was attributed to the vic-
rim. The "duty of care" of an employer requires that 
the deminer be protected appropriately when he is 
working as directed on a required task such as this one. 
The second most co mmon incident involves 
stepping on a "missed-mine." Missed-mine incidents 
ind icate that clearance has not been effective. T hese 
types of incidents should never occu r. Some time-
served groups have not had any missed-mine inci-
dents; others have had many. Th is fact implies that it 
is possible to work in a way that avoids them. Inci-
dentally, there is no evidence of a greater risk of miss-
ing a mine when demining in areas with minimum 
metal mines. In the vast majority of missed-mine in-
cidents, the m ine was a PMN , PMN-2 or PPM-2, 
all of which have a large metal content. Even in Cam-
bodia where minimum metal mines are relatively 
common, as many deminers have stepped on PMN-
2 mines as on all m inimum metal mines combined 
(T72, M 14 and M D 82Bs). The evidence in the 
DDIV suggests t hat the best defense against the 
missed-mine risk is to avoid them by using better 
working methods and adequate supervision. 
The next most common incident occurs when 
handling a device, sometimes one believed to be safe. 
Better training could alleviate ignorance, and some 
groups could avoid the risk altogether by not allow-
ing devices to be handled. Practical protection is im-
possible without introducing a barrier so thick that 
the device becomes roo remote for tactile feedback. 
Avoidance is the only open strategy. 
The next most common incident is recorded as 
"victim inattent ion." This type covers rimes when 
deminers accidentally fall over a mine, walk into an 
uncleared area or otherwise behave in a thoughtless 
manner. While in some cases close supervision and 
rigorous training might have prevented the incident, 
it has to be accepted that moments of inattention will 
occur. It is impossible to predict what an incident like 
this will involve. The only practical protection seems 
to be that which is used for other incidents. 
The next most common incident is recorded as 
"detection/tri pwire." This type covers incidents where 
a tripwi re was pulled or a deminer trod on a device 
while clearing land (the area was not declared "clear" 
at the time; so, the mine was not technically missed). 
Fai lure of equipment and careless use of the detector 
were the causes for these incidents. I believe that this 
type is another case where protecting the deminer 
would be best achieved by ensuring that the incident 
did not occur. 
The next most common incident is recorded as 
"survey," which occurs when a survey is being made 
or when a mine is in itiated in an area declared "free 
from mines" or "reduced" during a survey. Most ac-
cidents involve mines that were missed during the 
survey; so, improving the qual ity of survey would 
have prevented most of them. No practical way of 
protecting against the remaining risk is apparent. 
The next most common incident is classified as 
"vegetation removal." These incidents involve pull-
ing a tripwire while cutting vegetation or stepping our 
of the safe area while doing so. Both could be avoided 
by enforcing existing operating procedures or by us-
ing, where possible, mechanical means to cut the veg-
etation prior to manual demining. Given that the risk 
includes the fragmentation mine threat, no practical 
protection against it is possible. 
The next most common incident classification 
is "other." This type covers a range of isolated inci-
dents with little in common. Several of the incidents 
involve the apparent sickness of the victim, which 
may be something spotted by the field management. 
The next most common incident classification 
is "demolition." This rype is rare 
and happens when an explosive 
injury occurs while charges are 
being prepared or laid for the 
demolition of a device(s) already 
located. These incidents have in-
cluded fragmentation mines. No 
effective protection could have 
been made available for some of 
these incidents, and at least some 
were caused by the victim breach-
ing operating procedures. It 
seems likely that improved train-
ing is the only practical way to reduce the number of 
these incidents and the severity of damage to the 
VICitmS. 
Of all the classifications mentioned above, the 
only incident that occurs even when a deminer ad-
heres ro his training and instructions is "excavation." 
This type is also the most common incident. For these 
two reasons, I believe it should provide the bench-
mark for protection needs. 
Protection While Excavating 
To protect a deminer against incidents that oc-
cur when excavating, we must be aware of the posi-
tion he is in and the areas of his body most at risk. 
Despite the claims of some ill-informed managers in 
the industry, the data in the DDIV clearly illust rates 
that almost all deminers work in a kneeling or squat-
ring position while excavating. This news is good for 
the deminer because he avoids the whiplash accelera-
tion injuries that have been associated with deminers 
in a stationary position with their heads only a few 
centimeters from the blast origin. The exploding de-
vice is almost invariably directly in front of and be-
low his body and head. Often, his hand is above or 
alongside the device. 
• 33 . 
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Severe (disabling) Injuries Recorded 
While Excavating 
Face & neck= 54 severe injuries 
Upper limb= 51 severe injuries 
Lower limb= 7 severe injuries 
Trunk/Body = 10 severe injuries 
The difference in size berween the injuries to the 
upper limbs and head (51-54) is statistically insig-
nificant in a sample of this size. The drop to seven 
for lower limb injuries is significant, as it illustrates 
the way that a fragment cone rises from a seat of ini-
tiation and the core of it often misses the legs (mi-
nor leg injuries were more common- 36). The drop 
to 10 for trunk/body injury is also significant, illus-
trating clearly that the main torso is not at the same 
degree of risk as the upper limbs and the head. Sev-
eral of the severe body injuries resulted from the tool, 
or part of it, hitting the body. 
Face and Neck Protection 
Despite the fact that some form of eye protec-
tion was issued, it was not worn in almost half of the 
recorded blast mine incidents. Eye injury accounted 
for 97 of the 236 blast mine victims in the database 
(more than one in three). 
Eye protection issued varies from industrial 
safety spectacles to 5mm polycarbonate visors. Safety 
spectacles were issued to 25 percent of the victims in 
the DDIV. In 33 percent of the cases, 3mm visors 
were issued, and these visors sometimes shattered 
(there were 19 severe eye injuries in excavation inci-
dents over rwo years in that theater alone). 
Visors made of 5mm thick untreated polycar-
bonate sheet that cover the face have been used by 
most professional groups (MAG, HALO Trust, NPA 
Mozambique & Angola, MgM, Koch MineSafe, 
Mine Tech, INAROEE, etc.) for some years, and their 
use is spreading. Some of the visors are short and at-
tach to helmets, all too often leaving the wearer's 
throat exposed (especially from below when kneel-
ing). Others are long and worn without helmets. 
When worn properly, these offer some protection to 
the throat when kneeling and looking down. 
I have tested 5mm untreated polycarbonate vi-
sors in over 40 blast tests using AP mines. They have 
not failed catastrophically, but a 5mm visor did break 
in two in one recorded incident. In one test, the 
material was penetrated by a steel fragment placed 
in the earth covering the mine. In several further tests 
against POMZ fragmentation mines, rhe visor was 
• 34. 
not penetrated at all , illustrating the unpredictability 
of mines but also showing that 5mm polycarbonate 
does not guarantee protection to a deminer excavat-
ing an AP blast mine. A full-face visor made of poly-
carbonate is light enough for sustained wear (thou-
sands of deminers use them) and is probably the best 
that can be provided until a lighter, stronger material 
is developed. This evidence suggests that 5mm poly-
carbonate full-face visors fixed in the "down" position 
should be the standard for facial protection while ex-
cavating AP blast mines. 
Upper Limb Protection 
It is unconventional to pur hands and arms 
among the areas needing protection. However, the 
DDIV recorded 51 severe upper-limb injuries from 
blast mine detonations, including 14 amputations of 
fingers and hands and I 0 of arms. These injuries are 
worse when the tool is short and used vertically. When 
the tool breaks into its component parts, deminers 
have been struck in the chest, upper arm and face with 
severe consequences. At least five deminers died after 
their hand-tool failed and fragmented in a blast. 
There is also evidence in the DDIV that hand 
and arm safety can be enhanced by using hand-shields 
and sensible manuf.:tcturing constraints rhar keep a 
tool in one piece. For example, in at least eight prod-
ding incidents with a simple tool made in Africa, the 
tool blade curved and the handle and blade stayed 
together. In none of these incidents was the deminer 
injured by his tool. 
The evidence from the DDIV supports my be-
lief that 
• To prevent hand injury when excavating, tools 
should be designed so that they are easiest to 
use at a low angle to the ground; and 
• To reduce hand and arm injury, tools should 
be designed to stay in one piece, should be long 
enough to keep the deminer's hand at least 
30cm from the blast and should incorporate a 
flexible blast shield whenever possible without 
reducing utility. 
Examples of such tools exist and are available 
commercially. 
Body Protection Against Fragmentation 
Protection designed to reach a STANAG V50 of 
450m/s (current U.N. standard) has proved less than 
adequate against bounding fragmentation mines. For-
tunately, fragmentation mine incidents are rare out-
side Europe, and there are no records of a bounding 
fragmentation mine incident occurring while exca-
vating. 
Body Protection Against Blast 
T he D D IV recorded 14 deminers dead as a re-
sult of blast mine detonations. Five of these victims 
were wearing frag-jackets of some kind, bur all five 
were not wearing head protection (or nor wearing it 
properly). Additionally, four of these involved severe 
head-injury; the fifth deminer was squatting and 
stepped on a mine so he suffered severe lower body 
injury. The frag-jacket did not appear to have "fail ed" 
in any of these cases. In excavation incidents where 
armor was worn, it did not fail; thus, the DDIV pro-
vides evidence that the STANAG 450m/s current 
standard of body protection is sufficient against the 
largest blast-mine threat (240g TNT) at a distance 
of 30cm. 
However, a STANAG V50 of 450m/s is no mea-
sure of blast protection. A blast mine detonation is a 
significantly different kind of threat, and the mate-
rials used to protect against it may not have the same 
fragmentation resistance despite being more effective 
against a blast mine detonation. An example of this 
situation is the low cost, flexible ballistic Aramid; it 
retains its integrity in a blast better than Kevlar, but 
it has a much lower V50, weight for weight. 
As the data in the DDIV shows, the armor cur-
rently issued is nor always worn. Deminers tell me 
that because it is heavy and uncomfortable, they feel 
that the bulkiness of the gear may increase their 
chances of making a mistake. This assertion explains 
why there has been a general move away from flak-
jackets toward frontal "aprons." Some of the aprons 
hang loose while others are strapped firmly to the 
body. Some aprons have a V50 as low as 380m/s; oth-
ers exceed 450m/s. The only type to fail in my tests 
had the higher V50, but it was made up of discrete 
panels that rhe blast separated. Conversely, the one-
piece apron with a lower V50 performed well in seven 
tests and in at least 15 real incidents. 
The evidence shows that the need for body pro-
tection may not be a high priority, but it is desirable. 
It is even more desirable if it is comfortable enough 
for a deminer to wear. Simple blast resistant frontal 
aprons have proved adequate to protect an excavat-
ing deminer in real incidents and comfortable enough 
to be worn without protest. Thus, the evidence sug-
gesrs that deminers should be issued frontal body and 
genital blast protection aprons (240g TNT at 30cm) 
when excavating. 
No Protection Because of No Real Risk 
There are a number of products available that 
offer protection against questionable risks. Facts sug-
gest that these risks are so rare that deminers feel that 
protection against them is unnecessary. 
There is no evidence among the data for over-
pressure internal injuries ("thoracic disruption") re-
sulting from an AP mine. The evidence in the DDIV 
proves beyond reasonable doubt that this "threat" is 
more commercially convenient than real. Presently, 
there is no evidence to suggest that blast-proof boots 
have reduced injury. Current evidence suggests that 
wearing blast-boots when stepping on a blast mine 
containing significantly more than 50g HE may ac-
tually worsen rhe level of severe injury. Also, the only 
• 35. 
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boots with some effectiveness against the smallest 
mines include a stand-off of at least 10 linear em in 
their design. These boots would be impractical in the 
mined environments I know. There is no evidence 
in the DDIV that wearing a helmet or a back-panel 
to body armor has ever significantly reduced these-
verity of an injury. 
Protection against hearing loss is sometimes sug-
gested. While there have been many claims of hear-
ing damage from single blasts in Afghanistan, this 
case has nor appeared in other theaters. The compen-
sation system in Afghanistan claims for low level and 
unverifiable ear damage (deminers could still return 
to work). Excluding Afghanistan, the DDIV lists only 
one claim of severe hearing damage resulting from a 
single blast (close proximity to a large device). 
Practical Approaches to Meeting Deminer 
Protection Needs: 
• Reducing the number of incidents that occur, 
and 
• Reducing the severity of injury when an inci-
dent occurs. 
The first can be pursued via changes ro work-
ing methods and improved supervision and manage-
ment. This approach is likely to be the most effec-
tive. The second can be pursued via the provision of 
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) appropriate for 
use at times when risk cannot be avoided. 
One Last Appeal 
Practical PPE That Could Reduce the Severity 
of Incidents: 
• Eye protection with a STANAG V50 equal to 
that offered by untreated 5mm polycarbonate 
(about 280m/s). This equipment must be in 
good condition and not reduce clarity of vision 
by more than I 0 percent; 
• Hand-tools rhat are fit for a purpose and are 
designed to minimize the risk of adding to in-
jury; and 
• Comfortable frontal blast protection (against 
240g TNT at 30cm) for use when excavating. 
The inclusion of a collar that overlaps the vi-
sor and closes any access to the throat in a blast 
is desirable. 
Some groups already do most of the above. A few 
of the organizations have done so for many years. This 
report provides evidence that my suggestions are prac-
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1 These activities are defined in detail in the 
DDIV. 
2 Statistics are based on the April 2000 release of 
the DDIV 
3 Submunitions with Anti-Disturbance fuses, 
frag-jackets and shaped-charges are a separate risk that 
requires a distanced approach and specialized SOPs. 
They have nor been featured in recorded incidents. 
Please, let us not spend mine-clearance money on unnecessary 
expensive equipment. Let us not load down a deminer with equipment 
that he will discard as soon as our backs are turned. Please, let us not 
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The Canadian Center for Mine 
Action Technologies Advances the 
Technological Realm of Demining 
by Stephanie Schlosser and Virginia Saulnier, MAIC 
T he Canadian Center for Mine Action Tech-nologies (CCMAT) is a partnership of re-sources from rhe Department of National 
Defense and Industry Canada. The Center is co-lo-
cated with the Defense Research Establishment 
Suffield (ORES) at Canadian Force Base Suffield in 
Alberta. 
CCMAT's mission is ro conduct research and 
development oflow cost, sustainable technologies for 
mine detection, mine neutralization, personal pro-
tection and victim assistance. The center also seeks 
to find alternatives to anti-personnellandmines and 
serve as an information hub on humanitarian 
demining technologies. CCMAT is a test and evalu-
ation site for new ideas brought forward by the Ca-
nadian Industry and its partners. 
After the CCMAT was established in August 
1998, Dr. Denis Bergeron quickly assumed an active 
role within the center. Previously, Or. Bergeron's 
background at ORES had directed his focus to the 
neutralization oflandmines; however, his interest has 
since shifted to the protection of de miners against ex-
ploding landmines. During an interview with the 
Journal, Dr. Bergeron offered candid responses con-
cerning CCMAT's main objectives, their current 
products and their vision for the future. 
Communication Venues 
Dr. Bergeron spoke extensively of the flowing 
web of communication present in the demining com-
munity, especially between Canada and the United 
States with respect to SOLIC and Fort Belvoir, Vir-
ginia, and the European demining organizations. "It's 
been excellent cooperation on that side [Fort Belvoir). 
There's also quite a bit of cooperation with the Eu-
ropean community .... There is a very frequent ex-
change of information, keeping each other aware [of) 
the progress." Maintaining open communication is 
vital to the advancement of demining technologies, 
as "there isn't enough money to try everything ... and 
certainly you don't want to quench any of the ideas 
that are coming out. However, you have to be selec-
tive as to pursuing which ones will actually make a 
difference in the field." 
• 37. 
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